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In the first competitive election for President of the Social Choice and Welfare
Society, the (official)  approval-voting winner differed from the (hypothetical) Borda
count winner, who was also the Condorcet winner.  But because the election was
essentially a toss-up, it is impossible to say who should have won.  The election for
Council was more true to form of other professional-society elections, with the winners
identical, and even their rankings almost duplicative, under both voting systems.
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A Nail-Biting Election
1
In 1999, for the first time in its history, the Social Choice and Welfare Society
(SCWS) held competitive elections for President and members of the Council.  There
were three candidates for President (one to be elected) and eleven candidates for Council
(eight to be elected).
What was unusual about this election was that (1) it was conducted under approval
voting (AV) and (2) voters were also asked to rank the candidates for each office,
presuming the Borda count (BC) as the method of election.  Thus, while AV was used in
the official election, hypothetical election results under BC could be used as a basis of
comparison.  In addition, voters were also asked to indicate their sincere and strategic
rankingsóshould they differóand where they would draw the line between approved and
non-approved candidates in these rankings (with one exception, voters did not give
strategic rankings different from their sincere ones).
In the past fifteen years, SCWS is the sixth professional society, with collectively
over 600,000 members, to have adopted AV in its election of officers (Brams, 2000).
2
                                                
1 We are grateful to Maurice Salles for providing us with ballots for the election described
herein.  Steven J. Brams gratefully acknowledges the support of the C.V. Starr Center for
Applied Economics at New York University.
2 The other societies are:  American Mathematical Society (AMS), American Statistical
Association (ASA), Institute of Management Science and Operations Research
(INFORMS), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and Mathematical
Association of America (MAA).  In addition, the Econometric Society and the National
Academy of Sciences use AV, or a variant, in the selection of fellows, as does the
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence in choosing candidates for
awards.4
While our book on AV (Brams and Fishburn, 1983) preceded these adoptions, the
subsequent analyses we and others have done of elections in these societies generally
support our arguments that AV tends to find consensus candidates (see Brams and
Fishburn, 1992, for an overview).  We readily acknowledge that some ranking
procedures, including BC, also have attractive properties (Brams and Fishburn,
forthcoming), but we regard AV as particularly appealing because of its simplicity and
practicability.
Donald Saari and some of his colleagues, who have made important contributions
to the study and comparison of voting systems (Saari, 1994), disagree with us on the
relative merits of AV and BC.  For an airing of these differences, we commend the reader
to an exchange we had more than a decade ago (Saari and Van Newenhizen, 1988a,
1988b; Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill,1988a, 1988b).  More recent and independent views
and analysis of different voting systems, including AV and BC, can be found in a multi-
authored symposium (ìSymposium:  Economics of Voting,î 1995).
Given this background and controversy, it seemed useful to compare AV and BC
in an election involving voters whose professional interests lie specifically in the area of
social choice.  Because our advocacy of AV has centered on its use in single-winner
elections, we will give more details on the SCWS election for President than for Council.
With respect to the Council election, we generally do not support AVís use in
multi-winner elections if the purpose of the election is to elect representatives that mirror
different viewpoints in the electorate.
3  For this purpose, there are other voting systems,
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not necessarily involving the straightforward aggregation of votesóeither approval votes
or rankingsóthat may be superior, depending on oneís notion of what constitutes a
representative body (Potthoff and Brams, 1998).
Analysis of Election Returns
In the SCWS election for President, there were three candidates, whom we call A,
B, and C (see Table 1).  Because 19 of the 71 voters in the electorate did not rank the
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Table 1 about here
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candidates, we give the BC results only for the 52 voters who did rank candidates, but we
present the AV results for both the 52 and the entire electorate of 71 voters.
However one counts votes, the election was a ìnail-biterîóa colloquialism for a
very close contest that causes people to bite their nails in anticipation of the outcome.
(Not that we think the outcome was so consequential, except perhaps for conferring
prestige on the winner.)  Under AV, in which voters can approve of as many candidates
as they like and the candidate with the most approval votes wins, the margin of victory
was only 2 votes in both the 52-voter (22 - 20 votes) and 71-voter (32 - 30 votes)
contests.  Under BC, in which candidates receive more points the higher they are ranked
(in a 3-candidate contest, a voterís first choice receives 2 points, its second choice 1 point,
                                                                                                                                                
3 What, then, is the justification for using AV to elect the SCWS Council?  If there are not
sharply opposing viewpoints in the electorateóas seems true of SCWSówe believe that
AV is an excellent procedure to find the set of most widely supported members whose
views, presumably, are representative of the society as a whole.6
and its third choice 0 points), the race was even closer (60 - 59 points) in the 52-voter
contest.
The big surprise was that candidate A won under AV, but candidate C would have
won under BC (at least according to the 52 voters who ranked candidates).  Moreover, C
is the Condorcet winner:  C defeats both A (28 - 24 votes) and B (32 - 20 votes) in
pairwise contests.  This can be verified from the numbers of voters who rank the three
candidates in the 3! = 6 different rankings, also shown in Table 1.
The 52 rankings are approximately randomly distributed over five of the six
rankings.  It is extraordinary that none of the 52 voters chose BAC.  Of the 52 voters, 49
cast one approval vote (always its first choice in the rankings), one approved of its top
two candidates, and two cast no approval votes, making the approval-to-ballot ratio 0.98.
The 19 voters who did not rank the candidates were somewhat more generous in
their approvals:  15 cast one approval vote, 2 cast two approval votes, and 2 approved all
three candidates.  This makes their approval-to-ballot ratio 1.32.
Normatively speaking, we view this election as one in which there is no
incontrovertible argument that A or C should have won.  To be sure, the fact that BC and
the Condorcet criterion agree on a single candidate (C), which will often not be the case
in a very close election like this one, supports the choice of C as the winner.
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On the other hand, the fact that A got more approval from both bullet voters (i.e.,
those who cast one approval vote) and the two-approval-vote voters indicates A to be
                                                
4 In seven 3-candidate elections of professional societies that were not so close and that
allowed for the reconstruction of preferences from approval votes, Regenwetter and7
more acceptable to both classes of voters who make distinctions among the candidates
(those who approve of none or of all the candidates are not making a distinction).  Hence,
Aís greater support is not an artifact of  where voters draw the line between acceptable
and nonacceptable candidates.
We turn next to the Council election.  Of the 49 (of 71) voters who ranked
candidates, 1 voter ranked five, 2 ranked six, 2 ranked eight, and the other 44 ranked all
eleven candidates (with some indicating ties, in which case we averaged the Borda points
associated with these ranks).  In determining Borda points for the truncated orders, we
started at 10 points, as if their orderings were complete, and went down 9, 8, Ö points
until the ranking ran out (so all candidates who were not ranked received 0 points from
that ballot).
As can be seen from Table 2 for the eleven candidates a, b, . . ., k, the BC ranking
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for the 49 Borda voters, and the AV ranking for both these 49 and the 71 voters in the
entire electorate, are nearly identical.  Only dís Borda count would put him slightly higher
(one rank, interchanging him with c) than his AV votes do.  As for the eight candidates
elected to the Council, they are identical under BC and AV.
The 49 Borda voters averaged 6.2 approval votes per ballot, and the 22 nonranking
voters averaged 5.3 approval votes per ballot.  Thus, the more conscientious Borda voters,
who took the trouble to rank candidates, were somewhat more approving, which was not
                                                                                                                                                
Grofman (1998) found that the AV and BC winners were identical and, in addition, were8
the case (to a greater degree) in the election for President, wherein the nonranking voters
were more generous in their approvals.
Comparing, in both the President and Council elections, the ratios of the number of
candidates to be elected to number of candidates running (President:  1/3 = .33; Council:
8/11 = .73), the 71 AV voters approved, on average, more than this ratio in the election
for President (.36), less than this ratio in the election for Council (.54).  We speculate that
in the election for President, the candidates were better known and therefore more
likelyóin relation to the number to be electedóto be considered acceptable.  In the SCWS,
it seems, familiarity does not breed contempt!
Conclusions
The election for President, by almost any measure, was a toss-up.  In an election
this close, we believe that no strong case can be made that AV votes should trump Borda
points, or vice versa, when they produce, as they did, different winners.  While one might
argue that the BC outcome is more compelling because the BC winner is also the
Condorcet winner, we think that an equally persuasive argument on the other side is that
the AV winner was more approved of by both bullet and nonbullet voters; hence, his
election did not depend on how discriminating, with respect to dispensing approval, the
voters were.
The Council election presented a completely different picture:  the eight candidates
elected under AV would have been identical under BC.  Indeed, the almost complete
                                                                                                                                                
invariably the Condorcet winners.9
coincidence in ranks of approval votes and Borda points for all eleven candidates struck
us as uncanny.
Comparing the experiences of the other professional societies that have adoopted
AV with that of SCWS, the election for Council is the norm, the election for President the
exception.  The AV and BC winners generally coincide with the Condorcet winner, at
least in single-winner elections.  For this reason, we believe AV should get the nod
because of its ease of use.
5
If there are multiple winners, as in the election for Council, we believe a
proportional-representation (PR) system is preferable to AV if there are factions in the
electorate whose members have different preferences.  AV provides no assurance that the
different factions will be able to elect candidates in rough proportion to their numbers in
the electorate, as do PR systems we discuss elsewhere (Brams and Fishburn,
forthcoming).
                                                
5 The fact that almost one-third of the SCWS electorate did not rank candidates,
especially the eleven in the Council election, does not seem to be because this election
was not the official one.  Rather, the task of ranking this many candidates, or voting
strategically, was too onerous, as more than one voter complained.10
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Table 1
Borda Counts, Approval Votes, Borda Rankings, and Majorities for President
       52 Ballots with Rankings                               Approval Votes
                    Votes in Position
             19 Nonranked
Candidates     1       2        3        Borda Count   Approval Votes              Ballots        Total
       A            24    11      17                59                    22                               10              32
       B             9     19      24                37                      9                                 5              14
       C           19     22      11                60                    20                               10              30
Borda Ranking     Frequency                 Majorities, Based on the 52 Ballots with Rankings
       ABC                    11                                                A > B             35 - 17
       ACB                    13
       BAC                      0   C > A             28 - 24
       BCA                      9
       CAB                    11   C > B             32 - 20
       CBA                      8
           Total               5213
Table 2
Borda Counts and Approval Votes for Council
     52 Ballots with Rankings                              Approval Votes
                    Votes in Position
             22 Nonranked
Candidates     1        2        3        Borda Count   Approval Votes             Ballots         Total
       a              8       6        4               329                   39                           15      54
       b              8       8        2               293                   36                               13              49
       c              2       5      10               277                   35                               12              47
       d             8        7        3            292             31             11      42
       e             1        8        6               259                   31                               11              42
       f              2        4       7                256                   29                               11              40
       g             9        3       7                256                   29                               10              39
       h             7        5       4                252                   27                               10              37
       i              2        0       4                195                   22                               11              33
       j              1        2       0                130                   12                                 7              19
      k              1        1       1                115                   13                                 5              1814